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BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a decision of the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Honorable James 
S. Sawaya presiding. Based on stipulated facts, the District 
Court granted Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, denied 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and held that Defendants 
had not violated state or federal statutes or regulations in 
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terminating part of the state's welfare program. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents respectfully request this Court to 
affirm the ruling of the District Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents Bccept the Statement of Facts as set 
forth by Appellants with two reservations: 
1. Federal regulations do not require that the 
obligation imposed on stepparents be "identical" with that 
imposed on natural parents, but rather that it be a law of 
"general applicability which requires stepparents to support 
stepchildren to the same extent that natural or adoptive 
parents are required to support their children." (Emphasis 
supplied.) 
2. The United States Department of Health, Education 
and Welfare has since receded from its objections to the Utah 
policy change. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IT IS NOT ESTABLISHED ·THAT THE STATE HAS 
FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE APPLICABLE FEDERAL 
REGULATIONS. 
Appellants argue that the state statute on stepparent 
support, the support of stepchildren Act, fails to comply with 
-2-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
federal regulations and is therefore invalid. Because of 
this alleged invalidity, plaintiffs claim that the act was 
relied upon improperly to stop welfare payments to the 
plaintiffs' families; as a result, plaintiffs continue, all 
those whose welfare payments were terminated under the 
statute should be retroactively awarded payment from the 
time the funds were discontinued. 
A. THE TRI-PARTITE TEST IS NOT A BASIS 
FOR STRIKING DOWN A STATE STATUTE. 
In support of their argument, Concerned Parents of 
Stepchildren (C.P.S.) rely heavily upon the 11 tri-partite test" 
which is used by the Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare (H.E.W.) to evaluate the support obligations of step-
parents in state implementation plans under the Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children (A.F.D.C.) program. 
The so-called "tri-partite" test originated in 
H.E.W.'s brief amicus curiae to the United States Supreme 
Court in Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970). H.E.W. 
urged that compliance with this test was essential for a 
state to qualify for federal financial participation under 
the AFDC program. As set out in H.E.W. letter to defendants 
dated June 8, 1979, (Appendix 1 in Appellants' brief) the 
test sets out three separate criteria which a stepparent's 
support obligation must meet: 
-3-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1. A duty of general applicability; 
2. One which an obligor could be compelled 
by court order to fulfill even after he 
has deserted or abandoned the household; 
and 
3. One which must exist regardless of whether 
the children would otherwise receive AFDC 
payments. 
Appellants maintain that the Utah statute is invalid because 
it fails to meet the second part of the three-pronged test, 
that of 11 coextensiveness," and cite several differences 
between support obligations of stepparents and natural or 
adoptive parents in Utah to show that the support of step-
children statute fails to meet H.E.W. regulations. 
Of the five problem areas that appellants find in 
the support of stepchildren statute, appellant's brief at 
9 through 11, the second and third were not found to violate 
the federal regulations by H.E.W. itself. And yet, appellants 
claim that great deference is due a federal agency in inter-
preting its own regulations, "unless there are compelling 
indications that it is wrong," Appellants' Brief at 11. The 
second problem area cited by appellants is the difference in 
ability to recover support obligations under Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 78-45-4.2. Although in her letter of June 8, 1979, 
the Regional Commissioner for H.E.W. disapproved of Section 
78-45-4.2, this disapproval was withdrawn after further 
consideration in the official letter of notice dated August 
-4-
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3, 1979, (Appendix 2, Appellants' Brief). 
In a letter to Respondent Anthony Mitchell dated 
November 23, 1979, (Attached as Appendix 1, hereto), the 
Assistant Regional Commissioner for Family Assistance 
explained: 
In correspondence dated August 3, 1979, 
the regional off ice had deleted previous 
objections to that section and the present 
position of the regional office remains 
the same. This is based on our analysis 
which concluded that the stepparent's 
right to reimbursement from a natural/ 
adoptive parent does not lessen his 
obligation to support his stepchildren 
as otherwise provided for under Utah 
law. 
The third difference between stepparent support 
obligations and those of natural or adoptive parents claimed 
by appellants as a violation of H.E.W. regulations, the liability 
for children aged 18 to 21 when ordered by a court in a 
divorce proceeding, Appellants' Brief at 10, was not cited 
at all as a difficulty by H.E.W. after its careful scrutiny 
of the Utah legislation. Are appellants unwilling to give 
to H.E.W. the deference which they urge this court to give? 
Concerning the other objections to the Support of 
Stepchildren Act, respondents submit that 45 C.F.R. 233.90(a) 
does not require a "coextensive" obligation. The word "co-
extensive" is not used in 45 C.F.R. 233.90(a). The federal 
regulation requires only that the stepparent's duty of support 
be "to the same extent" as that of a natural or adoptive 
-5-
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parent. There is a significant difference between these 
terms. "Coextensive" means "having the same scope or 
boundaries; occupying the same space or period of time." 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary, copyright 
1976, at 439. There is an apparent connotation of identical 
time (duration) and space (limits). Obviously the support 
obligation of a stepparent cannot be identical either as to 
time (duration) or space (scope) to that of a natural parent. 
An obligation "to the same extent" however is a different 
thing. To the same extent means to the same degree or limit. 
See Webster's Third New International Dictionary, supra at 
805. It is obvious that this expression must be applied in 
the context of the particular situation involved and not as 
an absolute standard. 
This distinction is not just a play on words. The 
significance of such distinction was recognized in the case 
of Archibald v. Whaland, 555 F.2d 1061 (1st Cir. 1977). 
Appellants criticize the use of Archibald v. 
Whaland, supra, first because it is "one of only two cases 
ever decided that upheld a state procedure as consistent 
with the requirements of 45 C.F.R. §233.90(a)." Appellants' 
Brief at 13. It should hardly need pointing out that each 
state is given considerable leeway in how it implements 
the federal AFDC program. The court decisions on whether 
the particular state statutes comply with the federal statutes 
-6-
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and regulations turn on the manner that the individual 
states have chosen to implement the federal plan. The number 
of cases falling on either side of the question is therefore 
irrelevant to this questioni the significant matter is 
rather, whether the particular case is helpful in analyzing 
the Utah statutes. 
In their effort to discredit the use of this case, 
t. appellants misrepresent the issue, as "whether exclusion of 
stepchildren from the New Hampshire criminal non-support 
t. statute violated the 'coextensiveness' test." The court 
:es 
itself stated that the fact that the criminal penalty could 
not be applied to stepparents was not determinative; in the 
court's words, "[t]he more crucial difference in the analysis" 
involved the statutes which imposed the legal obligation in 
the first place - the Uniform Civil Liability for Support 
Act, which was enforceable against both stepparents and 
natural parents. Archibald v. Whaland, 555 F.2d 1061 at 
1066 (emphasis supplied). That H.E.W. agreed with New 
Hampshire that the obligations of stepparents and natural 
parents were essentially similar is not a primary question: 
we're dealing with two different offices of H.E.W., each 
of whom makes its own determinations, and moreover, the 
reason respondents rely on the case here is because of the 
reasoning, which is sound, and the underlying similarities 
-7-
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in the facts between Utah and New Hampshire, which should 
result in a similar determination in this case. That H.E.W. 
came to a different determination at a different time and a 
different place is of little moment. 
In Archlbald, the Circuit Court was reviewing a 
district court determination that stepchildren were not 
protected "to the same extent" as natural children because 
stepparents were not covered by New Hampshire domestic 
relations laws which require natural parents to continue the 
support of their children after legal separation, pending 
and after divorce. The review court held that "to the same 
extent" does not mean "identical and coextensive". The 
court stated: 
Recalling our discussion of King v. Smith, 
supra, and Lewis v. Martin, supra, we believe 
the court's teaching in these cases to be that 
the support function served by AFDC itself could 
only be replaced by a breadwinner with the 
"approximate" support obligation of a natural 
parent. Were all of the obligations to be 
identical and coextensive, the effect would 
be a compulsory requirement on all states 
participating in AFDC (and all states do 
participate) to have civil support, criminal 
support, and divorce and separation laws 
treating natural, adoptive, and stepparents 
equally in all respects. We can discern 
no interest of national welfare policy that 
requires such pervasive monitoring of state 
domestic relations laws. 
555 F.2d 1066. 
In Lewis v. Martin, supra, the fountainhead case 
in which 45 C.F.R. 233.90(a) was sustained by the Supreme 
-8-
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Court, a similar "approximation" test was suggested. Nothing 
is said in Lewis v. Martin relating to an "identical" or 
"coextensive" degree of support. The court concluded that 
it was reasonable for H.E.W. to require that the stepparent 
support obligation be to the same extent as a natural or 
adoptive parent and then stated: 
Any lesser duty of support might merely 
be a device for lowering welfare benefits 
without guaranteeing that the child would 
regularly receive the income on which the 
reduction is based, that is to say, it 
would not approximate the obligation to 
support placed on and normally assumed 
by natural or adoptive parents. 
397 U.S. at page 567 (Emphasis added.) 
Even assuming the word "coextenstive" is a legitimate 
synonym for the expression "to the same extent," it is interesting 
to note that at least one court has found said word to mean 
something less than identical. In the case of Kelley v. Iowa 
Department of Social Services, 197 N.W.2d 192 (Iowa 1972), 
the court held that it is immaterial that a stepparent may 
have the power to leave the family and terminate his obligation 
of support, and that so long as the stepparent has a support 
obligation while living with the stepchild the law is of 
general applicability and his obligation is conextensive with 
the natural parent's obligation. Id. at 199. 
The "tri-partite" test was neither referred to by 
the Supreme Court in the Lewis decision nor specifically 
-9-
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adopted in that case. At least two courts and perhaps the 
United States Supreme Court by implication, have excised one 
or more of the criteria. See Kelley v. Iowa Department of 
Social Services, supra, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 813, and 
Archibald v. Whaland, supra. 
In the letter to defendant Anthony Mitchell of 
June 8, 1979, the Acting Regional Commissioner for the 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare acknowledged 
that the Department is considering whether to modify its 
policy in relation to the treatment of stepparents but 
"unless a decision to change the present policy is made, 
which has not yet occurred, the Department is still following 
the 'tri-partite' test." (See Appendix 1, Appellants' 
Brief). To rule in favor of petitioners on the basis of 
strict adherence to the "tri-partite" test, when the test 
is neither statute nor regulation, and when it is under 
review by H.E.W. itself, seems unfair and unjustified. 
B. THE UTAH AMENDED PLAN DOES COMPLY 
WITH 45 C.F.R. 233.90(a). 
Petitioners charge that respondents "concede that 
the terms of Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-45-4.1 did not 
meet the requirements of 45 C.F.R. 233.90(a)" because 
respondents urged the Utah legislature to make certain changes 
in the Support of Stepchildren Act. Respondents do not and 
have not conceded that the recently passed legislation violates 
-10-
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any federal law. In order to prevent the loss of vital 
federal funding, without which the children in their care 
might be seriously disadvantaged, respondents have suggested 
certain changes to the legislature. That action was taken 
because of the continued disagreement between the Department 
of Social Services and H.E.W. and the increasingly technical 
criticism which the Utah Department of Social Services was 
experiencing from the H.E.W. Regional Office. That action 
to insure the preservation of its programs cannot be 
construed as an admission. 
Appellants also state that the "agency interpretation 
of the Social Security Act and its own rules coincides with 
the arguments of Appellants .... " Appellants' Brief at 12. 
Two instances have already been discussed herein where that 
is not the case. Appellants do not clearly delineate which 
of the differences they note in stepparent versus natural or 
adoptive parent support obligations under the Utah statutes 
go to the general applicability and "coextensiveness" tests. 
Respondents will therefore assume that appellants adopt the 
analysis of H.E.W. and show why that analysis is incorrect. 
45 C.F.R. 233.90(a) requires that a State plan under 
Title IV-A of the Social Security Act must provide that determ-
ination of eligibility for assistance will be made only in 
relation to a stepparent who is (1) ceremonially married to the 
child's natural or adoptive parent, and (2) legally obligated 
-11-
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to support the child under state law of general applicability 
which requires the stepparents to support stepchildren to the 
same extent that natural or adoptive parents are required to 
support their children. The Utah plan amendment utilized the 
same language verbatim. The issue is whether or not the 
Utah State law is of general applicability. 
The Utah Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, 
Sections 78-45-1 et seq., Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended 1979, included stepparent within the definition of 
"parent" and defined "stepparent" as a person ceremonially 
married to the child's natural or adoptive parent. It also 
provided that a stepparent shall have the same duty of support 
as a natural or adoptive parent, provided that upon the 
termination of the marriage or "in cases where there is a 
filed pending divorce action with separation or a legal 
separation" the support obligation will be as if the marriage 
had never taken place. 
The Supreme Court in Lewis v. Martin, supra, agreed 
that it was reasonable to require the state law to be of 
"general applicability" in order to provide a solid assumption 
for estimating funds actually available to the child. In 
the Archibald case, supra, the court discusses the term in 
the context of special exceptions or exclusions. It states 
that if the statute applies to all natural, adoptive and 
stepparents, is not "tailored to welfare," and covers 
-12-
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children of all ages, it is a state law of "general applic-
ability," concluding that 
We think that the requirement of 
"general applicability" focuses on 
arbitrary limitations which make it,,'. 
clear that the duty of support is 
defined not in terms of the stepparent 
relationship, but primarily in terms 
of welfare eligibility. 
555 F.2d at 1065. 
The Archibald case specifically separates the "general applic-
ability" requirement from the "to the same extent" requirement 
as phases one and two of its inquiry. In other words, whether 
the state law requires the stepparent to support the child to 
irt the same extent as.the natural or adoptive parent does not 
determine whether the statute has general applicability, and 
is a separate concern. The H.E.W. analysis has corruningled 
these two considerations in the instant situation and concluded 
that since in its opinion the stepparent does not have a 
coextensive duty with the parent, then the state law does 
ea , not have general applicability. ·In the Kelley case, supra, 
the court had little difficulty in concluding that the law 
ion was one of general applicability so long as the stepparent 
has the same duty of support as the parent while living with 
the stepchild. 197 N.W.2d at 199. As the Utah statute 
absolves the support obligation only when the stepparent has 
both filed divorce and separated it would appear that the 
Utah circumstance is the same as that involved in the Kelley 
case. 
-13-
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our decision, a very small tail would indeed 
be wagging a very large dog. Unless absolutely 
identical and coextensive support obligations 
are envisaged by the regulation, this de minimis 
descrepancy should not determine the issue of 
compliance with 45 CFR 233.90(a). 
Archibald, supra, at 1066. 
The distinction is de minimis as a p~actical matter 
for the following reasons: 
When considering the allowance of stepparent income, 
two separate aspects are involved: (1) the eligibility of the 
family group for AFDC and (2) the amount of the grant to be 
received. The child qualifies for assistance only if he has 
been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the 
death, continued absence from the home, or physical or mental 
incapacity of a parent. 42 U.S.C. 606(a). The amount of 
assistance depends upon the income and resources of the child 
or any other individual (including stepparents) living in 
the same home as the child. 42 U.S.C. 602(a) (7). Consideration 
of stepparent income under 45 C.F.R. 233.90(a) becomes critical 
therefore not so much in determining eligibility but in 
determining amount of assistance. It follows that the question 
of "coextensiveness" of support obligation is really of little 
practical importance since regardless of such test the actual 
contribution of either parent or stepparent while living 
with the child can be included in determining the amount of 
assistance to be given. An abstract concern as to the exact 
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Respondents conclude, therefore, that since the Utah 
statute applies to all stepparents, covers children of all 
ages, and does not depend on welfare eligibility, the statute 
is of general applicability. The fact that the stepparent 
may terminate his obligation by filing for divorce and separating 
from his wife_ is, as stated in the Kelley case, inunaterial in 
relation to the question of general applicability. 
Any post-separation distinction between the support 
obligation of the stepparent and the parent is de minimis both 
as to legal and practical consequences. 
The distinction is legally de miriimis because it 
really has no effect on the application of 45 C.F.R. 233.90(a). 
The Kelley case, supra, seems to say that any disparity 
in support obligations between natural parent and stepparent 
upon leaving the home is legally inconsequential. In the 
Archibald case, supra, the court says that even if the disparity 
is not inconsequential, it is certainly irrelevant when it is 
considered that when a stepparent leaves the family, the AFDC 
program becomes available. The point is succinctly stated 
by the Archibald case as follows: 
We see no reason of welfare policy that would 
make post-separation support obligations germane 
to the question of compliance with 45 CFR 233.90 
(a) which deals with the requirements to be met 
if AFDC is not to be available .... 
Nevertheless, if the differential in support 
obligation of such limited scope were to control 
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"coextensive" duration of the stepparents obligation is in 
fact irrelevant, since once the stepparent leaves the home 
his contribution is no longer pertinent in establishing or 
in determining the amount of assistance. Truly, the only 
critical period as to the required similarity of the parent 
and stepparent obligation under 45 C.F.R. 233.90(a), 
particularly in relation to a "reasonable" "solid assumption" 
of income as spoken of in the Lewis v. Martin case, supra, 
such as would justify discontinuance of statewide stepchild 
assistance program, is during the time the stepparent is in 
the home. 
In fact, from this standpoint in regard the amount 
of assistance, it becomes clear that the precise proviso in 
the Utah statute under attack is in reality a saving grace 
of the Act. If the stepparent's support obligation survives 
his separation from the family then there may be a time, at 
least pending new application, when the stepparent is in 
fact making no contribution and the child in need rec~ives 
no assistance because the stepparent's contribution is assumed. 
It should also be noted that the number of stepparents 
who would fall in the tiny crack of stepparents who have "filed 
for divorce with separation" (the group being used by H.E.W. 
to disqualify the State plan) would be a small fraction of 
the stepparents involved in the stepchild assistance program. 
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The post-separation distinction between parent and 
stepparent as to support obligation in the state statute is 
both legally, and as a ·practical matter, de minimis, and it 
does not destroy the general applicability of the statute. 
Even if this court ~hould find that in some way 
respondents erred in compliance with the relevant federal 
1 statutes or rules, the proper course for the court to take 
:il~ 
1. 
is to leave the remedy to H.E.W. 42 U.S.C. § 604(a) 
provides: 
§ 604. Deviation from plan 
(a} Stoppage of payments 
In the case of any State plan for aid 
and services to needy families with 
children which has been approved by the 
Secretary, if the Secretary, after 
reasonable notice and opportunity for 
hearing to the State agency administering 
or supervising the administration of such 
plan, finds-
(2) that in the administration of 
the plan there is a failure to comply 
substantially with any provision re-
quired by section 602(a) of this title 
to be included in the plan; 
the Secretary shall notify such State 
agency that further payments will not 
be made to the State (or in his discretion, 
that payments will be limited to categories 
under or parts of the State plan not 
affected by such failure) until the Sec-
retary is satisfied that such prohibited 
requirement is no longer so imposed, and 
that there is no longer any such failure 
to comply. Until he is so satisfied he 
shall make no further payments to such 
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State (or shall limit payments to 
categories under or parts of the 
State plan not affected by such 
failure). 
This is the proper remedy for the violations alleged 
by appellants, and H.E.W. may be presumed to have satisfied 
itself at this point that such sanctions are not necessary. 
Appellants do not even assert now that the statute imposing 
a duty of support on stepparents is unconstitutional. They 
do not~ nor can they, dispute the power of the Utah legi~lature 
to impose a duty of support upon stepparents. They merely 
assert that the manner in which the duty was imposed did not 
comply with certain technical requirements of the federal 
government relating to the public assistance programs. Indeed, 
appellants ilo not appear to be in the narrow categories 
potentially deprived of the benefits as a result of lack of 
"coextensiveness." Rather they merely object to the overall 
result of the imposition of the duty upon stepparents. They 
have no valid claim to a remedy in this Court, and the matter 
of failure to comply with H.E.W. regulations should be left 
to H.E.W. 
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POINT II 
RESPONDENTS HAVE SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED 
WITH THE APPLICABLE NOTICE AND FAIR HEARING 
REQUIREMENTS. 
The requirements for notice and hearing where state 
agencies intend to discontinue or reduce family assistance 
are laid out in four steps in 45 C.F.R. § 205.lO(a) (4) (iii): 
When changes in either State or Federal 
law require automatic grant adjustments 
for classes of recipients, timely notice 
of such grant adjustments shall be given 
which shall be "adequate" if it includes 
(1) a statement of the intended action, 
(2) the reasons for such intended action, 
(3) a statement of the specific change 
in law requiring such action and 
(4) a statement of the circumstances 
under which a hearing may be obtained 
and assistance continued. 
(Emphasis added, and numerals inserted for clarity.) 
The Utah Assistance Payments Administration sent out 
the following notice on May 10, 1979, pursuant to the passage 
of the Support of Stepchildren statute by the legislature: 
Effective May 31, 1979, your financial 
and medical stepchild assistance case will 
be discontinued. The reason for this 
closure is because of a change in the Utah 
law which becomes effective May 3, 19 7 9. 
(Vol. II, Sec. 232) 
You may be eligible for other types of 
assistance including Food Stamps, Medical 
Assistance, Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children for the entire family, or restricted 
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state stepchild program. If you wish 
to apply for any of these programs, 
contact your local Assistance Payments 
Office at 2835 South Main PO Box 15729, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115, Phone 582-
5200. 
A fair hearing request will not be 
granted unless you feel the reason 
for the closure action was for other 
than the change in state law. 
If you have any questions regarding 
this notice, please contact the office 
listed above. 
Although simple and straight forward, this notice 
met each of the requirements of the regulations. First, it 
states the intended action, discontinuance of financial and 
medical stepchild assistance, and second, gives the reason--
the change in the Utah law. Third, the specific change in 
the law is cited, Volume II, section 232 of the Financial 
Assistance Regulations of the Assistance Payments Administration. 
The fourth of the provisions requires "a statement 
of the circumstances under which a hearing may be obtained 
and assistance continued." (Emphasis supplied.) The "and" 
suggests that both the hearing and continuing assistance are 
necessary, and a hearing which does not lead to continuing 
assistance would not need to be mentioned in the notice. 
45 C.F.R. § 205.lO(a) (5) states: 
An opportunity for a hearing shall 
be granted. to any applicant who requests 
a hearing because his or her claim for 
financial assistance ... or medical 
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assistance is denied, or is not acted 
upon with reasonable promptness, and to 
any recipient who is aggrieved by any 
agency action resulting in suspension, 
reduction, discontinuance, or termination 
of assistance. A hearing need not be 
granted when either State or Federal 
law require automatic grant adjustments 
for classes of recipients unless the 
reason for an individual appeal is 
incorrect grant computation. 
The only exception to the rule that hearings are 
not required is when there is an appeal in the case of an 
incorrect grant computation. This subsection also sheds 
light on the fourth provision of 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(4) (iii). 
For a hearing leading to continued assistance, there must 
have been an incorrect grant computation. The next to 
last sentence of the May 10 notice sent by the Assistance 
Payments Administration states, "[a] fair hearing request 
u~ will not be granted unless you feel the reason for the 
~ t closure action was for other than the change in state law." 
re 
This is just what the federal regulations provide - no 
hearing unless for an incorrect grant computation. 
4 5 C. F. R. 2 0 5. 10 (a) ( 6) states : 
If the recipient requests a hearing 
within the timely notice period: 
(i) Assistance shall not be suspended, 
reduced, discontinued or terminated, 
until a decision is rendered after a 
hearing, unless: 
(A) A determination is made at the 
hearing that the sole issue is one of 
State or Federal law and not one of 
incorrect grant computation; 
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Both (a) (5) and (a) (6) predicate the holding of a hearing 
on a request for a hearing by the welfare recipient. And 
yet, appellants have never met even this fundamental 
threshhold requirement for a hearing. 
The failure to bring this case under the federal 
provisions should block further consideration of appellants 1 
claims. 
Appellants rely on Budnicki v. Beal, 450 F.Supp. 
546 (E.D. Pa. 1978), a case which involved widespread cheating 
and abuse of a state orthopedic shoe program. Pennsylvania 
understandably wished to terminate the program which was 
optional under federal regulations, but lost its case in 
federal district court. Appellants cite the case for the 
contention that failure to comply with federal regulations 
requires a reinstatement of the terminated program. However, 
the case is distinguishable from the present matter. First, 
the only notice given of the termination of the Pennsylvania 
program was in a news circular; no notice of termination was 
sent to any of the welfare recipients. The court does not 
state that a timely request for a hearing is not still 
necessary under its decision, provided adequate notice is 
given. In that case, of course, no such hearing request 
was possible since no notice was given initially. In the case 
at hand, however, timely notice was sent, and appellants failed 
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to make the necessary hearing request. 
Appellants cite Curtis v. Page, No. 78-732 (N.D. 
Fla. Apr. 13, 1978, Appendix 4 of Appellants' brief), for 
the proposition that a failure to specifically state the 
change in the law renders a state's notice inadequate. No 
reference to any change in the law was made in the notice 
in that case. Utah's notice, on the contrary, does state 
the specific change in the law, as discussed above. 
· There is nothing in the apparently complete and .in~ 
•I 
la 
!S 
self-contained statement of 45 C.F.R. § 205.lO(a) (5) indicates 
to the state administrator attempting to deal with the complex 
and murky federal regulations that (5) might be modified by 
45 C.F.R. §205.lO(a) (6) and that he must read further before 
drawing up his state's notice of termination or reduction. 
At least one court has criticized 45 C.F.R. §205.lO(a) (6) for 
its ambiguity. Budnicki v. Beal, supra, at 553. Although 
respondents maintain that they have substantially complied 
with the federal regulations, if ·some mistake was made, 
there was certainly a good faith attempt to follow the 
provisions. 
Both Turner v. Walsh, 535 F.Supp. 707 (W.D. Mo., 
1977), and Viverito v. Smith, 421 F.Supp. 1305 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), 
also cited by appellants, indicate that in the final analysis, 
a court's remedy for any failure to comply with the federal 
requirements necessitates a weighing of the equities involved 
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in each case. Certainly in the case before the court, 
involving as it does, over two million dollars in retro-
active payments alone, not to mention the substantial 
expense, time, and difficulty in reopening the 1800 cases 
involved, and its threat to the fundamental doctrine of 
leaving appropriations questions to the legislative branch, 
should weigh heavily against the remedy appellants seek. 
In all the C.F.R. provisions discussed herein, the 
common theme of notice and hearing presupposes "agency action," 
a term used in 45 C.F.R. §§ 205.lO(a) (4) (iii), 205.lO{a) (5), 
and 205.lO(a) (6). The underlying difficulty is that the 
agency was simply implementing a recent legislative enactment. 
No benefits were terminated because of "agency action." 
Rather they were terminated because of legislative action. To 
grant fair hearings on the issue of wether stepparent assistance 
should have been terminated for these plaintiffs would be to 
set the hearing decision-maker above the legislature, a result 
that clearly makes no sense in our system. 
If the court should remand the case for new notice 
by the Assistance Payments Administration, even that action 
would be of little help to appellants, who would still need 
an appropriation from the legislature in order to receive any 
benefits. This illustrates the reason that no hearings were 
held by the agency in the first place - there was no real 
alternative to the action taken. 
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POINT III 
DEFENDANTS HAVE SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED 
WITH ALL APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF THE 
UTAH RULE-MAKING ACT. 
Appellants claim that respondents failed to comply 
with the procedures of the Utah Rule-Making Act (Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 63-46-1, et seq.) in terminating assistance 
to the stepchildren. Appellants have not shown any authority 
supporting their claim that the conditions and circumstances 
faced by the respondents did not justify use of the emer-
gency procedure. An examination of the relevant provisions 
of the Code is in order here. 
(1) Prior to the adoption, amendment, 
or repeal of any rule, the agency shall: 
(a) Give notice of its intended action. 
This notice shall include a statement of 
either the terms or substance of the intended 
action or a description of the subjects 
and issues involved, the reasons for the 
proposed rule, and the time when, the place 
where, and the manner in which interested 
persons may present their views regarding 
it. The notice shall be mailed to all 
persons who have made timely request of 
the agency for advance notice of its 
rule-making proceedings and shall be 
published in the bulletin to be published 
by the state archivist as provided in 
section 63-46-7. The state archivist 
shall maintain for notice of rule making 
a list of names and addresses of persons 
who request mailed notice of agency rule 
making as required by this act. Except 
as provided in subsection (2), (3), and 
(4) of this section, no action shall be 
taken by the agency until at least twenty 
days have elapsed following such mailing 
and publication of this notice. 
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(b) Afford all interested persons 
reasonable opportunity to participate in 
rule making by submitting data, views, 
or arguments, either orally or in writing, 
as determined by the agency. In the case 
of substantive rules 1 an opportunity for 
oral hearing must be granted if requested 
by 25 persons, by a governmental sub-
division or an agency, or by an association 
having not less than 25 members if requests 
are made in writing within fifteen days 
after the mailing and publication of the 
last notice of rule making. Upon adoption 
of a rule, the agency, if requested to do 
so by an interested person either prior 
to adoption or within thirty days there-
after, shall issue a concise written 
statement of the principal reasons for 
and against its adoption, incorporating 
in this statement its reasons for over-
ruling the considerations urged against 
its adoption. 
(2) If an agency finds that an imminent 
peril to the public health, safety, or 
welfare requires adoption of a rule without 
providing the notice required by subsection 
(1) of this section and states in writing 
its reasons for that finding, it may proceed 
without prior notice or hearing, or upon 
any abbreviated notice and hearing that it 
finds practicable, to adopt an emergency 
rule. The rule may be effective for a 
period of not longer than 120 days, but 
the adoption of an identical rule under 
subsection (1) of this section is not 
precluded. 
(3) If an agency finds that any of the 
rule-making procedures required by this 
section are impracticable, unnecessary, 
or contrary to the public interest with 
respect to the adoption and filing of a 
particular rule or a particular designated 
type or class of rules, it may, to the 
minimum extent require by that finding, 
proceed without compliance with this section 
to adopt and file such rule or rules, if 
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the agency adopts and files with the rule 
or rules a written statement of findings 
and reasons for such action which shall 
be published in the bulletin along with 
the rule or rules. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-46-5. 
There is no authority holding that the severe 
budgetary limitations experienced by respondents as a result 
of legislative decisions did not justify resort to the 
emergency provisions outlined in Utah Code Annotated, Section 
63-46-5(2) as cont~ined above. The difficulty in appellants' 
position becomes apparent upon the realization that following 
the rule-making procedure would be a useless exercise and a 
waste of agency funds and time unless such action could have 
changed the result. If the agency involved had the power to 
continue the assistance to the stepchildren, the effect would 
be to give the agency through its rule-making process, primacy· 
over the legislative process. The obligation of the agency 
is to follow the statutes and guidelines of the legislature. 
The power of the purse is an inherent power of the legislative 
branch, and the legislative power is vested in the House of 
Representatives and Senate, Utah Constitution, Article VI, 
Section 1(1), and no person charged with responsibilities of 
onebranchof government shall exercise functions appertaining 
to the others. Utah Constitution, Article V, Section 1. 
The Utah Budgetary Procedures Act, Utah Code Annotated, Section 
63-38-1 et seq., outlines the procedures to be followed in 
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the budgetary process. Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-38-1 
(2) provides: 
In providing that certain appropriations 
are to be expended in accordance with a 
schedule or other restriction, ... it is 
the intent of the legislature to limit 
thereby the amount of money to be expended 
from each such appropriations item for 
certain specified purposes. Each such 
schedule shall be a restriction or 
limitation upon the expenditure of the 
respective appropriation made, .... 
The intent of the Utah Constitution and the Budgetary 
Procedures Act is to clearly delineate the powers of government 
and to carefully prevent improper expenditures. The result 
pressed for by appellants is illogical, upsets the procedures 
of government, and should not be entertained by this Court. 
The rule-making process in this instance served the sole 
purpose of translating the legislative mandate of Senate 
Bill 54 and its related budget cuts into the format of the 
Department's eligibility manual. 
Even had the Department started earlier with its 
rule-making process and gone through the regular procedure 
rather than the emergency procedure, the result was still a 
foregone conclusion because the legislature had cut off the 
funds for the program at issue. 
The rule-making process offered no potential 
restoration of the several million dollar appropriation 
which the legislature had deleted for stepchild assistance. 
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etar; 
Without the appropriation the executive officials were 
powerless to maintain the program. But, even through the 
emergency rule-making process there was an opportunity for 
the plaintiffs to register their views. There has 
been no indication whatsoever that the named plaintiffs or 
any potential member of the plaintiff class attempted to 
exercise any prerogatives in the rule-making process at 
the time the new rule was announced in the rule-making 
bulletin of May 1. Plaintiffs did not even file this 
lawsuit until the 31st of May, 1979, which raised a serious 
question as to the timeliness of their request in seeking 
relief against the initial implementation of the rule-
making. Any injunctive relief invalidating the rule-making 
process would be equitable in nature, but plaintiffs simply 
did not file a timely action for this kind of equitable relief. 
The actual process of terminating the stepchild assistance 
program was substantially completed long before the 31st of 
May. Issuing checks for the month of June was a process 
that would have required several weeks of preparation. It 
could not have been done overnight as plaintiffs seem to 
believe. 
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POINT IV 
THIS COURT LACKS THE POWER TO COMPEL A 
STATE AGENCY TO FUND A PROGRAM RETRO-
ACTIVELY. 
If the Court grants the retroactive benefits that 
appellants seek, it will in effect be making a new budgetary 
appropriation in clear contravention of the intent of the 
legislature in passing the Support of Stepchildren Act. 
Senator Kay s. Cornaby, who was the sponsor of Senate 
Bill 54, indicated in his floor discussion of the statute 
just before it was passed overwhelmingly in the Senate and 
later by the House, that the intent of the measure was 
to reduce unnecessary expenditures to those who don't really 
need the money to support their stepchildren. Citing the 
fact that the statute was designed to prevent the abuse of 
public tax funds by awarding it to parents whose income was 
already adequate, Senator Cornaby stated that the bill would 
save an estimated two million dollars in state funds and four 
and a half million dollars in federal appropriations. He 
concluded by saying, "We ought to be able to save that money, 
especially in this era of concern about excessive expenditures 
in state government." (Utah State Senate Floor Discussion, 
January 17, 1979.) The tenor of the remarks by Representative 
LaMont Richards in House discussion is very similar and 
evidences~concern that many parents whose incomes were in 
the middle to upper middle ranges were receiving funds in 
violation of the intent of the stepchildren support program. 
-30-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
See Utah House of Representatives Floor Discussion# February 
6, 1979. 
The power of appropriation is one of the fundamental 
powers delegated to the legislature. By its very nature it 
involves balancing of competing political considerations and 
is therefore inherently a job for elected representatives. 
This budgetary power includes not only the right to appropriate, 
but the right not to appropriate for a given program. If the 
money necessary to achieve the result desired by appellants 
is awarded, then less money will be available for the needs 
ly .which the legislature found more pressing. It is not within 
the province of the court to determine the relative merits 
of different spending proposals, especially when not all the 
information necessary for such a decision is before the Court. 
~d In this case, the legislature expressly refused to grant the 
~ money. The Utah Constitution, in Article V, Section 1 provides 
that there is to be no such overstepping of bounds by members 
iy, of the different branches of the state government. 
1re) As James Bryce said in comments on the structure 
of the federal government, but which are equally apropos here: 
~ "There remains the power which in free countries has long been 
regarded as the citadel of parlimentary supremacy, the power 
of the purse. Congress has the sole right of raising money 
and appropriating it to the service of the state." The 
American Conunonwealth, 158 (1905). 
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It is not proper to permit those who have lost a 
legislative battle to hurry into court to require the 
extensive expenditure of money which they couldn't get in 
the proper forum in the first place. Granting the remedy 
appellants seek in effect gives the Court power that not 
even the Governor has; the Governor may reject an entire 
act of the legislat~re, but even he, with his powers to 
propose the budget, cannot turn a non-appropriation into an 
appropriation. See the Budgetary Procedures Act, Utah Code 
Annotated, Sections 63-38-1 et seq. The power of the purse 
is one of the most basic prerogatives given to the legislative 
branch, and concerns all of the legislature's deliberations. 
The framers of our system of government never intended the 
legislative bodies to become mere bookkeepers~for the courts. 
In his discussion of the proper role of the judiciary, 
Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist Paper No. 78, "The 
judiciary has no influence over the sword or the purse; no 
·direction either of the strength.or the wealth of the society; 
and can take no active resolution whatever." 
Merely by way of example of the difficulty inherent 
in a proposed fiscal appropriation by the judiciary, in 
Lovett v. U.S., 66 F.Supp. 142 (Ct. Cl., 1945), the court 
ruled that, although three individuals had a right to be 
paid for their federal employment, (in the light of a 
congressional appropriations measure providing that government 
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employees not be paid their salaries unless Congress 
confirmed their continued employment) it could not order 
Congress to appropriate or the Treasury to pay the money. 
No money was paid the employees, deserving though they were, 
until the House finally passed a bill awarding them their 
salaries. 
CONCLUSION 
The Support of Stepchildren Act complies substantially 
with the Social Security Act and federal regulations and was 
properly used to terminate welfare benefits to appellants. 
ive As the correspondence between respondents and the regional 
commissioner for the Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare indicates, Utah has done everything in its power to 
5, comply with the federal regulations. The act, as amended 
in the most recent legislative session, has received no 
further objection from H.E.W. 
The implementation of the act also substantially 
ty; complied with the federal notice .and hearing provisions and 
with the Utah Administrative Procedure Act. 
nt The analysis and remedy suggested by appellants is 
impractical and violates fundamental state constitutional 
doctrines. The proper remedy in the matter, if any was 
necessary, was for H.E.W. to take. It has seen fit to take 
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no action. Respondents respectfully submit that the most 
judicious course for this Court to follow is to affirm 
the considered opinion of the district court. 
Dated this 12th day of June, 1980. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
PAUL M. TINKER 
SHARON PEACOCK 
Assistant Attorneys General 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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\ j .;lfl"\I ~ """ ¥' ..... I ~~~==~~ :-!:-:"!\L.TH. EDUCATION. AND WEL.rARE OFRCEOF ~f eXCCUll\IU)IRl:CfQi 
Dr. All thony W. Mitchell 
Executive Director 
REGION VIII 
FEDERAL OFFIC-E BUILDING 
1961 STOUT STREET 
DENVER. COLORADO 80294 
NOV 2 3 1979 
~ f/,_~9791.J 
' o.f 
SOCIAL sa:u"!/lJ.\ 'lr 
ADMINISTRATI~ 
Department of Social Services 
150 West North Temple 
RECEIVED ~~ 
i'. n \/ u IJ 'Iv .r I.: 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
UTAH SlATE QfffCE 
OF AHGR~~EY GENERAL Dear Dr. Mitchell: 
This is to confirm a telephone conversation bet¥een Mr. Keith Oram 
and Ms. Barbara Costa, held on November 7; 1979. The subject of that 
conversation was revisions proposed to be made to Utah Senate Bill 54, 
"Support of Stepchildren. 11 
Mr. Oram had earlier requested regional office's opinion on whether the 
original language contained in Section 78-45-4.2 could be retained. In 
a letter dated October 26, 1979, Mr. Oram had transmitted a copy of 
proposed revisions for Senate Bill 54, designed to overcome previous 
HEW objections to the "Support of Stepchildren" law. One of the proposed 
revisions was the deletion of Section 78-45-4.2. 
The regional office response was that Section 78-45-4.2 could be retained 
in its original language. In correspondence dated August 3, 1979, the 
. regional office had deleted previous objections to that section and the 
present position of the regional office remains the same. This is based 
upon our analysis which concluded that the stepparent's right to reim-
bursement from a natural/adoptive parent does not lessen his obligation 
to support his stepchild.Ten as otherwise provided for under Utah law. 
Please be advised that this correspondence relates only to the regional 
office's position on Section 78-45-4.2 and that our analysis of the 7 
remainder of Senate Bill 54 has not yet been completed. We ~'ill advise 
you as soon as that process has been completed and at that time, ~ii.11 
provide you "With our position on the total bill. 
Your cooperation in this matter is appreciated. 
cc: 
::::::::::::::::. 
Sincerely, 
~c~ 
Leza Gooden l;z.--~ 
Assistant Regional Commissioner 
Family Assistance cc· K'2.f t/I\.~ 
, . P4",,11~ 
Associate Commissioner for Family Assistance -vIA~/ rt'La"tl"'I.-<" ,,~ P-~ Central Office 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and exact 
copies of the Brief of Respondents, postage prepaid, to 
Bruce Plenk, Utah Legal Services, Inc., Attorneys for 
Appellants, at 352 South Denver Street, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, 84111, on this the 12th day of June, 1980. ( 
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